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Trends in Communist Propaganda

17 Jul 74

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**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

17 JULY 1974  
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## CYPRUS

### TASS STATEMENT HOLDS GREECE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKARIOS OUSTER

Moscow's initial coverage of the 15 July coup staged by Greek-commanded units of the Cyprus National Guard focused on the fate of President Makarios, who reportedly had been killed, and on resistance by government loyalists. The first authoritative reaction came in a TASS statement released late on the 15th and dated the 16th, which accused the Greek Government of interference in Cyprus' internal affairs and seemed to imply Soviet interest in Western and/or Security Council action on the crisis. Presumably in light of Makarios' arrival in London on the 17th and his probable appearance before the Security Council, Moscow's domestic service at 2000 GMT on the 17th began broadcasting a Soviet Government statement on Cyprus, text of which is not available at this writing.

The TASS statement made no suggestion of any Soviet initiative, and Moscow reported without comment Makarios' appeal on the 16th, broadcast from Paphos, to "all the great powers," friendly countries, and peace-loving peoples to support the Cypriots in their struggle for independence and refusal to accept "Greek dictatorship." Soviet "public" reaction has come thus far only in a statement of support for the Cypriot people from the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Greek Democrats and an expression of solidarity with Makarios from Patriarch Pimen. Moscow has indicated its contempt for the new regime in Cyprus, branding Nikos Sampson as a creature of the Greek military junta.

TASS STATEMENT      The 16 July TASS statement supported Makarios as the legally elected president and blamed the "Greek military" for the antigovernment putsch, demanding that the Greek Government immediately end the "open interference" in Cyprus' internal affairs. TASS pointed out that the coup was led by Greek officers serving in the National Guard whose removal had recently been demanded by Makarios "in connection with their antigovernment activities." The statement held the Greek Government responsible for the consequences should the "interference" continue.

The statement was notable for the absence of the usual stereotyped charges that "NATO circles" were masterminding subversion and terrorism on Cyprus through mainland Greek and Cypriot reactionary agents. Comment prior to the coup and continuing reportage on

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events have routinely charged NATO interference in Cypriot affairs--long a basic element of Soviet comment on Cyprus. But the TASS statement toned down such accusations and merely professed to see threads of the plot leading to external forces which it said had long plotted against Cyprus' independence and sovereignty. The last, previous TASS statement on Cyprus, in February 1970, had included the usual cliches about "criminal anti-state activities" in Cyprus as components of a plan fostered by "NATO circles" for a settlement of the Cyprus question which would be prejudicial to the interests of the Cypriot people and to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

The present TASS statement failed to link the current crisis to security in the Mediterranean and made no reference to a "settlement" of the Cyprus issue. But PRAVDA's Greek and Cypriot commentator Nikolay Bragin in an article on the 17th, as reported by TASS, made up for these omissions. Denouncing the "plot of the Greek military" against Cyprus' freedom and independence, Bragin asserted that the masterminds of the "rebellion" tried to force on the Cypriot people "a regime and a solution" of the Cyprus issue that had nothing in common with the will of the Cypriots. Bragin declared that the "military mutiny" would unavoidably lead to the heightening of tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and to aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations.

The TASS statement said that events in Cyprus might cause serious international complications, and complained that they went against the trend toward international detente. The statement did not indicate any Soviet course of action, but did seem to suggest that Moscow envisioned action by Western powers and/or the Security Council when it concluded that the Soviet Government was undertaking demarches to the governments of Greece and Turkey as well as to the United States, Britain and France as permanent Security Council members.\*

U.S. ROLE      TASS seemed implicitly critical of U.S. inaction in reporting on the 16th that a State Department statement described the armed coup "against the legitimate government" as an internal Cypriot affair and said the United States supported Cyprus'

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\* In the past, Soviet demarches on Cyprus have gone unheralded in Moscow media, but have been publicized by the AKEL (Cyprus communist party) organ KHARAVYI. See the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 14-16, and of 26 March 1970, pages 4-5.

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independence, territorial integrity and constitutional institutions. TASS juxtaposed to this item a report on a 16 July Washington POST editorial which noted that while the State Department had for months received warnings that Athens might try to "fan nationalist conflict" in Cyprus, it had failed to warn Greece against interference.

In the same vein, TASS reported on the 16th that a group of U.S. Congressmen, expressing concern over the threat to Cyprus' independence and to peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, had sent a message to the Secretary of State urging the U.S. Government "to take necessary steps to insure appropriate international actions" to avert the military threat to Cyprus and its lawful government.

GUARANTOR POWERS,  
SECURITY COUNCIL

Moscow thus far has avoided any reference to Turkey's right, as one of the three guarantor states (Turkey, Greece and Britain) under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to intervene in Cyprus. But Moscow has publicized calls by British "progressive circles" urging the government to take "decisive action" to support President Makarios and to prevent the establishment of a "fascist regime" in Cyprus. TASS on the 16th cited the British CP organ MORNING STAR as calling Foreign Secretary Callaghan's reaction "so far totally unsatisfactory" and declaring that what is needed is not "diplomatic evasiveness" but action to "end the aggression." The TASS dispatch also cited a Labor MP as asserting that Makarios' chances of reestablishing order were very strong, and pointing out that under the Treaty of Guarantee Britain "was obliged to act" if Cyprus' independence was threatened.

Other TASS reports from London on the 16th noted Britain's permission for Makarios to enter the British sovereign base areas, and cited a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that Britain continues to regard Makarios as president. The spokesman was reported as adding that Britain had expressed to Greece its concern over events in Cyprus and their effect on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and that London was also in touch with other NATO countries.

Reporting from Istanbul, TASS cited a Turkish Government spokesman as saying that Turkey had appealed to Britain to use British troops in Cyprus for joint Turkish-U.K. action in case the "leaders of the military rebellion" acted contrary to the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community or tried to annex Cyprus to Greece. TASS reported the Turkish information minister as saying that intervention in Cyprus might be undertaken in order to protect the Turkish community there, and later noted that the Turkish president was convening a session of

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the Grand National Assembly on the 18th to "decide the question about the possibility of Turkish military interference" in Cyprus. TASS also quoted Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit as declaring that "Greece is violating the independent status of Cyprus."

Moscow has persistently stressed the Greek role in the coup, and its minimal reportage from Athens, in contrast to essentially straightforward reporting from other capitals, has been caustically critical. Thus TASS on the 16th in a dispatch from Athens observed that a broadcast statement by the Greek foreign minister was an attempt by the Greek authorities "to absolve themselves of responsibility for actions" against Makarios. The statement, TASS charged, "deliberately ignores the Greek Government's direct responsibility for systematic subversive activities" in Cyprus by Greek officers of the National Guard who acted against Makarios.

Brief accounts of the 16 July Security Council session, jointly called by UN Secretary General Waldheim and Cyprus' UN representative, reported that Soviet delegate Safronchuk "strongly denounced" the interference of external forces in Cypriot affairs and urged the Security Council to take "necessary decisive steps" to end the armed "Greek military interference" and "insure immediately the withdrawal of Greek servicemen from the territory of Cyprus." Moscow apparently has not mentioned Britain's request to Greece, reported by Foreign Secretary Callaghan to the House of Commons on the 16th, that Greece "replace" as soon as possible the Greek officers in the National Guard in order to reduce tension.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS

Moscow has conveyed its antipathy to the new regime of Nikos Sampson established on the day of the coup; no Soviet acknowledgment of the takeover was made until the afternoon of the 16th, when the domestic service and TASS remarked that "self-styled president" Nikos Sampson had been sworn in by the discredited former bishop of Paphos, Gennadios, who was defrocked last year. The accounts described Sampson as editor of the "extreme rightwing" paper I MAKHI, "known for his close links with the Athens regime and with EOKA-B conspirators." Moscow pointed out that he had returned only two or three days before the coup from Athens, where he "evidently received instructions" from the Greek circles "inspiring the present mutiny."

Moscow has publicized two statements by AKEL (the Cyprus communist party) as well as one by the KKE (the Greek CP) denouncing the coup. A TASS dispatch from Beirut on the 16th carried the text of an AKEL appeal to the Cypriot people to "offer resistance" and rally around

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Makarios, and the agency reported a statement by AKEL Deputy Secretary General Fantis, now in Moscow, who ascribed the coup to Greece, attacked Nikos Sampson, and declared that the Cypriot people "badly need support and solidarity from progressive forces." Soviet publicity for AKEL pronouncements is in no way unusual and would certainly be expected in the circumstances. Thus, while it is plausible that Moscow would view AKEL as a core of any resistance to the new regime, publicity for AKEL statements is not necessarily evidence that the Soviet Union is promoting resistance activity. The TASS statement's assertion that the Soviet people "are fully on the side of those who are giving a rebuff to the mutineers" would seem to be, at this stage, only a generalized expression of support. TASS reports of loyalist resistance to the takeover have somewhat diminished.

**EAST EUROPEAN REACTION** Yugoslavia and Romania have been the most vigorous in their protests against the coup in Cyprus. Statements by Yugoslavia's Federal Executive Council on the 15th and by AGERPRES on the 16th avoided holding their Balkan neighbor responsible for the action, but Bucharest followed up the AGERPRES statement by reporting on the 16th that Foreign Minister Macovescu had summoned the Greek ambassador to express the Romanian Government's anxiety over the coup "organized by Greek officers." According to AGERPRES on the 16th, Macovescu declared that Bucharest recognized only the lawful government led by President Makarios, considered that "every measure be taken for the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus," and expressed conviction that the Greek Government would act to "liquidate the situation created which nobody can accept."

President Tito, in a statement on the 16th, categorically denounced the "attempted putsch" on Cyprus, "behind which stands a foreign country," and expressed his indignation at the attempted "physical liquidation of my great friend and Yugoslavia's friend President Makarios." TANJUG has reported Yugoslav diplomatic approaches to both Greece and Turkey, conveying to the former Belgrade's "serious concern" over the coup.

The official Yugoslav and Romanian statements, as well as one by the Bulgarian news agency BTA on the 16th, expressed concern that the events in Cyprus increased danger to peace and security in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, with AGERPRES also specifying the Balkans. The statements from Belgrade and Bucharest--like that of TASS--condemned the intervention as a violation of the UN Charter and basic principles of international law. All three were emphatic in their support of the legitimate Cyprus Government of President Makarios.

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The BTA statement, while not holding Greece responsible, did say that Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard, "directed by certain circles abroad," had mounted the coup against the Makarios government. BTA called for Security Council measures to halt interference in Cyprus' internal affairs and "restore democratic order." A Polish news agency statement issued late on the 16th also condemned the attempt to overthrow the "rightful" Cyprus Government, engineered by "external forces." East Germany and Hungary have weighed in with statements by peace councils and other groups.

Czech reactions have thus far been confined to press comment, with RUDE PRAVO on the 16th asserting that the Greek regime had "finally seized the island." The paper was unique in offering some mild criticism of Makarios: Despite his progressive views, he was a "disciple of bourgeois policy and had too idealistic views and could not rightly estimate the monstrosity of fascism." In a commentary on the 17th RUDE PRAVO assailed the Athens regime for its "impudent lie" that the events in Cyprus were an internal matter and went on to criticize the United States' official statement as also "putting a mask of 'internal affairs'" on Cypriot developments.

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## U. S. - SOVIET SUMMIT

## RESULTS OF ARMS TALKS DEFENDED, ROLE OF SOVIET POWER DEBATED

Editorials in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and RED STAR registered a large measure of agreement in assessing the results of the recent U.S.-Soviet summit but differed in analysing the factors contributing to its favorable outcome. All three presented the third Nixon-Brezhnev meeting as the culmination of two years of the new direction in relations begun during the President's first visit and stressed the importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Europe, the Middle East and Indochina. RED STAR went on to point to the continuing military danger and the role of Soviet power in maintaining world peace. Like the comment surrounding the summit, the editorials eschewed last year's plaudits for Brezhnev's personal role in improving U.S.-Soviet relations. While the mainstream of Soviet commentary has denied that the summit ran into difficulty on SALT, broadcasts to North America have blamed forces within the United States for the failure of the summit to produce an agreement on this subject. Concern over continuing arms development has led USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov to warn of the possibility of a new acceleration of the arms race and a consequent setback to U.S.-Soviet detente.

RED STAR's editorial on 9 July, unlike those in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 7th, called for continued vigilance in the face of unabated military preparations in the West. The editorial went from quoting an assertion of the New York TIMES that 1974 had been the most peaceful year since World War II to warning that "the clouds of military danger still darken the sky above our planet." That caution echoed recent speeches by Defense Minister Grechko in Moscow on 4 June and in Chita on 11 July. In his 4 June election speech Grechko had warned that the danger of war was still a "grim reality." The paper also reiterated the theme, stressed by Grechko and other military spokesmen over the past year, that the stability of peace depends on the enhancement of Soviet might. "In increasing the power and might of the Soviet Union," it said, "we are thereby strengthening the foundations of a stable peace on earth."

## ARBATOV ASSESSMENT

USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov offered his assessment of the summit in a 13 July IZVESTIYA article. He also strongly defended the summit's utility and stressed in particular that the discussions on SALT in Moscow and Oreanda "marked a considerable advance on very important military-political questions." But he showed marked concern about continuing arms developments despite U.S.-Soviet efforts thus far. Further

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developing a thesis he has spoken of since the aftermath of the Middle East crisis last fall, Arbatov warned that new agreements are needed soon or "a new turn in the arms spiral will inevitably begin," with resulting adverse ramifications in the political sphere as well. He offered a clear rebuttal to the arguments of military spokesmen who have, as in the RED STAR editorial, linked the stability of peace with enhanced Soviet military strength. Addressing the claim that it is risky to limit arms and even more so to reduce them, he reiterated Brezhnev's 14 June rejoinder that "it is an immensely greater risk to continue to accumulate weapons without restraint." In a post-summit assessment in last year's 22 July PRAVDA, Arbatov had taken issue more specifically with the power-behind-peace thesis, arguing that "power in itself does not guarantee peace, much less detente."\*

U.S. PESSIMISM  
ON SALT

Assessments of the summit for the Soviet audience have also taken issue with Western accounts denigrating the summit's accomplishments on SALT. Most notably, a posture like Arbatov's on the Nixon-Brezhnev discussions and the value of the new instructions to the delegations in Geneva was exhibited in Yuriy Zhukov's normally frank questions and answers session on Moscow TV on 6 July as well as in a TV roundtable assessing the summit on the 11th in which prominent academic and government officials participated. According to a lengthy TASS account of the roundtable, TASS head Leonid Zamyatin argued that the decision to reach an agreement extending until 1985 and the formulation of new instructions represented "a major and positive victory". Zamyatin showed sensitivity to criticism of the partial nature of the test limitation treaty signed at the summit, asserting that Moscow had argued for a complete ban only to be frustrated by the traditional sticking point of U.S. insistence on on-site inspection.

Taking a different tack on the Western criticism of the arms discussions, one commentary to North America on 11 July cited recent remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger and Senator William Fulbright to support the claim that the failure of the summit to reach a new SALT agreement was the fault of pressure from the U.S. military and its friends. A roundtable discussion broadcast to North America on

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\* Arbatov's article and other contributions on this issue are discussed in the 23 August 1973 TRENDS SUPPLEMENT, "Soviet Debate over Role of Military Power During Detente."

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the 14th echoed reports in the U.S. press of Moscow's own hesitancy to take major steps in any case because of the President's precarious domestic situation. According to an observer on the broadcast, "There is also reason to think that had any agreements been concluded in the area of offensive weapons they would have been labeled as concessions to communism and used to whip up hysteria by those forces that are dead set against putting an end to the arms race."

CONTRASTING MEDIA  
TREATMENT OF SUMMITS

In 1972 and 1973 RED STAR's immediate evaluation of the summit had more closely followed the line of the central press as a whole and failed to place any notable stress on remaining pitfalls in the international situation. Nevertheless, military spokesmen writing in the paper after the summit forcefully reasserted the need to maintain military priorities in a period of detente.\* Seeming lessened concern to maintain a uniform assessment of the summit in the major editorials this year accords with other commentary throughout the talks which failed to dampen critical evaluation of U.S. policies and the U.S. internal scene. By contrast last year's Brezhnev visit was marked by a virtual embargo on direct criticism of U.S. policy.

PEKING VIEWS U.S. POLICIES FAVORABLY AFTER NIXON VISIT

In the wake of China's discreet initial reaction to this year's U.S.-Soviet summit,\*\* Peking has taken pains in recent comment to highlight evidence of U.S. resolve to improve relations with China while concurrently showing approval for what it sees as the Nixon Administration's continued firmness in dealing with Moscow on critical East-West issues. Peking's post-Moscow summit comment has been similar to its favorable treatment of the United States in the weeks preceding it,\*\*\* suggesting that Peking is sanguine

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\* Developments in the wake of the 1972 and 1973 summits are discussed in the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 28-30, and in the 23 August 1973 TRENDS SUPPLEMENT.

\*\* Peking's initial response to the summit was discussed in a FBIS Special Memorandum of 9 July 1974, "Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Nixon's Second USSR Visit," page 13.

\*\*\* For background, see TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 12-13.

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that there were no great advances in U.S.-Soviet cooperation during the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings. At the same time, the President's remarks on U.S. policy toward China made to the visiting PRC Wushu delegation were promptly publicized by NCNA on 13 July. It cited particularly his observation that normalization of Sino-U.S. relations remains a "major goal of American foreign policy" and his request that the delegates convey his regards to Chairman Mao, Premier Chou and other "good friends" he met in 1972.

In contrast with its circumspect propaganda following previous Nixon-Brezhnev meetings, in the wake of this year's summit Peking has commented more bluntly on continued superpower rivalry over Europe, the Middle East and strategic arms. A 14 July NCNA commentary went to unusual lengths to portray President Nixon's visit to West Europe prior to the Moscow meeting and Secretary Kissinger's consultations with West European leaders after the summit as evidence of U.S. determination to shore up the allied position on the continent against suspected Soviet encroachments. The commentary acknowledged that U.S.-West European frictions had increased following the start of the Middle East war last October and over pressing economic problems, but it pointed out that "Soviet social-imperialism's expansionist ambitions and its military threat to Western Europe" had prompted renewed Nixon Administration efforts to resolve disagreements with its NATO allies as well as increased West European receptivity to those efforts. It noted in this regard that mutual U.S.-West European concessions had resulted in successful shows of NATO unity at the 18-19 June NATO foreign ministers' meeting and at the 26 June NATO summit prior to the President's trip to Moscow.

Peking has continued to point up superpower rivalry as the salient feature of the Middle East situation, presenting U.S. diplomatic successes as Soviet setbacks. This view was reaffirmed by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at separate banquet speeches this week for visiting foreign ministers from Turkey and Tunisia, while a 13 July NCNA report portrayed Brezhnev's decision to postpone the expected Moscow visit by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy as a sign of Soviet displeasure with Washington's recently expanded influence in Cairo at Soviet expense. Peking has also indicated it sees the arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow as having little effect on the superpowers' arms race, noting in an 11 July NCNA report that both sides renewed underground testing only one week after the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreement to curb such tests.

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## INDOCHINA

### SIHANOUK REJECTS LON NOL PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The 9 July Lon Nol proposal for unconditional negotiations with Cambodian opposition forces was rejected in a lengthy statement by Prince Sihanouk the following day. Sihanouk reiterated the Front's stance, voiced by insurgent leader Khieu Samphan on his international tour this spring, that ending the U.S. involvement in Cambodia was the key to peace.\* The insurgent press agency AKI carried the text of Sihanouk's statement on 12 July, following up a day later with a communique which did not directly mention the peace proposal but scored the Phnom Penh leaders for their "tricks" to mislead the Cambodian people. The Cambodian Government's last major peace proposal, on 6 July 1973, was first rejected in a statement by the Front Propaganda and Information Ministry and later criticized in Sihanouk's 43d message to the Cambodian people.

The current Sihanouk statement demanded an unconditional, immediate end to U.S. "interference" in Cambodia and maintained that "the sole abettor of war in Cambodia is U.S. imperialism" and that "the key to war and peace in Cambodia" is in U.S. hands. Echoing the stance he took in response to Lon Nol's peace proposal a year ago, Sihanouk affirmed that without a U.S. disengagement, the Front would "fight the enemy to the death." He reiterated complete opposition to negotiations or formation of a coalition government with the Phnom Penh regime, and did not repeat his previous offer of negotiations with the United States. Sihanouk affirmed that "the return of peace to Cambodia does not need to go through 'negotiations' or an 'international conference,'" but can be realized merely by an end to U.S. "interference" and military aid. The Prince's statement appeared to reflect less concern than last year about international pressure on the Front to compromise; it did not repeat the criticism in his July 1973 message of unspecified foreign powers for attempting to bring about a settlement contrary to the insurgents' interests.

The brief AKI communique and lower-level Front comment have backed Sihanouk's adamant stance with reaffirmations of resolve to continue fighting until achievement of the Front's five-point program. Commentaries have scorned the peace initiative as a U.S.-sponsored maneuver reflecting the weakness of the Phnom Penh government. Though categorically condemning chief Cambodian Government leaders by name,

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\* For background on Khieu Samphan's statements on the U.S. role, see the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 12-13.

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the comment has in some cases implied Front flexibility in dealing with lower-level Phnom Penh supporters--a line first put forth authoritatively in Sihanouk's 43d message to the Cambodian people marking the Lon Nol peace offer last year. An AKI commentary on the 13th carefully specified that the "ringleaders" in Phnom Penh who must be annihilated represent "only seven individuals," and indicated that their removal would open the way for Cambodian reconciliation.

Chinese and Vietnamese communist media have avoided authoritative comment on the latest Lon Nol peace offer--a pattern consistent with the low posture adopted in their reaction to the peace plan last year. Peking promptly replayed Sihanouk's 10 July statement but carefully deleted passages harshly critical of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. NHAN DAN and LPA commentaries on the 14th attacked the Lon Nol proposal, reaffirmed support for the five points, and called for an end to U.S. involvement in Cambodia.

#### DRV DELEGATION DISCUSSES ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOFIA, BERLIN

The North Vietnamese delegation currently being led by Vice Premier and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi on a tour of Eastern Europe has broken with the pattern of past economic missions headed by Nghi during the war which traditionally visited Hanoi's major communist allies each year to sign agreements on economic and military assistance.\* While some aid agreements may yet be reached during the trip, none was signed during the delegation's first official visit, in Bulgaria. The delegation's talks in Sofia evidently focused on long-term economic coordination between the two countries and may have laid the groundwork for conclusion of an aid agreement later this year. The composition of the delegation appears to reflect its different emphasis: It includes State Planning Commission Vice Chairman Le Khac, but there have been no reports of the usual representatives from the ministries of defense and foreign trade who accompanied Nghi in the past.

During its 9 to 13 July stay in Sofia the DRV delegation was received by party chief Zhivkov and held talks with Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ivan Iliev. According to Bulgarian media,

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\* Annual aid agreements were also concluded in the first postwar year, 1973. The DRV's aid agreements for 1974 with East European countries were discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 3-6; 1 August 1973, pages 20-21; 15 August 1973, pages 3-5; 25 October 1973, pages 19-21; and 31 October 1973, pages 25-26.



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the talks covered "questions of cooperation between the two countries for 1975 and the period 1976-1980 in the sphere of planning." Sofia has also reported that the two countries "reached agreement on coordinating their plans during the next five-year plan period . . . ." (Le Thanh Nghi in a February 1974 report to the DRV National Assembly had announced North Vietnam's intention to undertake a new five-year plan beginning in 1976, but there has been little elaboration on the plan in subsequent Hanoi comment.) VNA's English-language report on the delegation's stay in Bulgaria did not provide such details on the economic talks but did state that Nghi and Iliev signed "documents" ("a document," according to VNA's French transmission) on the "strengthening of the economic cooperation" between the two countries. Sofia's reports state that an "aide-memoire" (pametna zapiska) was signed "on the visit of the delegation."

The DRV delegation arrived in Berlin on the 13th and has been received by SED Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Horst Sander mann and held talks with Gerhard Schuerer, candidate member of the Politburo, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission. VNA on the 16th reported that the talks dealt with the "development of the economic cooperation and goods exchanges between the two countries for the present and the future," and with "GDR aid to the DRV in 1975." No mention of aid was made, however, in an East Berlin radio report on the 15th, which described the talks as covering "the deepening of economic and scientific and technical cooperation" and the planning of the two countries' economies "down to 1980."

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## CHINA

## RED FLAG ARTICLES STRESS PARTY LEADERSHIP, UNITY

Peking's continued determination to restrict the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius so that it does not result in factional strife affecting economic production was illustrated by articles in the July RED FLAG affirming the need for party leadership and unity. An article on strengthening ideology in the party sharply pointed up to party members--especially new members--that they are expected to play a major role in leading the mass movement. Cautioning against the view that "party members take part in the mass movement the same way the masses do," the article warned that new members in particular "still lack tempering in party life."

Like the 1 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the party anniversary, the RED FLAG article stressed that the ideological campaign should strengthen the party and must be conducted under party committee leadership. The article, however, placed special importance on the role of new members, instructing party committees to regard education of new members as an "urgent task." Perhaps with special reference to problems caused by some new members, the article cautioned committees that it was a "grave mistake" to work "for the interests of oneself and a few people." Party members, the article declared, must abide by the party principles of "discipline" and "unity" and should fight against all acts "which weaken party leadership, violate its discipline or hamper its interests."

Peking's efforts to build the party into a more disciplined and responsive control organ appear aimed most immediately at insuring that undisciplined mass groups operating outside the party's authority do not hamper economic production and marketing. Another article in the July issue of RED FLAG contained an elaboration on themes expressed in a 3 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which had instructed party committees to take "active measures" to insure the transport of commodities from the countryside to the cities.\* Stressing the importance of transportation, the article faulted certain members of a party branch of a Tsinan railway subbureau for failing to play their leading role after being criticized by the masses in big-character posters and being faced with "certain

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\* See the TRENDS of 3 July, pages 21-22.

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signs of disunity." Some members of the party branch apparently overreacted to the poster criticism and "hastily dealt with some policy matters," aggravating problems between the leadership and the masses and weakening unity within the railway subbureau. To correct these shortcomings, other members of the party branch held "heart-to-heart" talks with those criticized cadres who were reluctant to boldly exercise firm leadership over the masses.

Placing considerably more stress on the responsibility of party members to lead the campaign than on having cadres turn inward and look for mistakes in their own work, the article strongly recommended that it was "immeasurably better" for party leaders to "take the initiative in accepting education and correcting mistakes rather than waiting and making passive self-examination." The party branch at the railway subbureau was lauded for taking this approach to the campaign and directing the enthusiasm aroused among the masses "into production."

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## K O R E A

## DPRK MARKS ANNIVERSARIES OF TREATIES WITH PRC, USSR

PEKING The anniversary of the 11 July 1961 DPRK-PRC treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was observed with banquets in both capitals and press comment, as it has been for the past several years. In a marked departure from Pyongyang's increasingly harsh public portrayal in recent months of events in the South, the KCNA reports of the banquet speeches showed unusual attempts to soften anti-U.S. and ROK rhetoric even below the relatively subdued level of the 1972 and 1973 banquet speeches. KCNA versions of the Korean speeches contained virtually no mention, much less condemnation, of the United States or the Pak government, although the NCNA versions reported, without any detail, that the North Korean speeches had included such denunciations. As he did last year, KPA Chief of Staff General O Chin-u spoke at the Chinese charge's banquet in Pyongyang. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who also spoke in 1973, addressed the DPRK ambassador's banquet in Peking. DPRK press comment was headed by a NODONG SINMUN editorial article and Peking comment by a PEOPLE'S DAILY article.

Both sides portrayed their relationship as strong and enduring; however, Peking media treatment indicated increasing PRC sensitivity over the security aspects of the treaty and the military nature of the alliance. Whereas KCNA reported that, as in 1973, both speakers at the Pyongyang banquet had cited the treaty as "defending the security interests of the two countries," NCNA versions omitted such references, which it had carried last year. NCNA also dropped General O Chin-u's reference to China's "might" as demonstrated by her nuclear tests and satellite launchings, an apparent Pyongyang attempt to rattle Peking's saber. Although banquet speeches by the Chinese raised the issue of the U.S. presence in South Korea, NCNA omitted the Chinese charge's demand at the Pyongyang banquet, as carried by KCNA, that U.S. troops "quit South Korea at once."\* In Peking, Li who had not raised the issue in his 1973 speech, said only that the Chinese supported the Korean demand that U.S. troops be withdrawn "completely." Pyongyang, perhaps disappointed with this less-than-stirring statement of Chinese support, did not include it in the KCNA version of the Peking banquet speeches.

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\* For a discussion of Chinese comment on U.S. troops in South Korea on two recent anniversaries, see the TRENDS of 26 June 1974, pages 19-20; and 10 July 1974, pages 8-9.

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MOSCOW Soviet treatment of the 13th anniversary of the 6 July DPRK-USSR treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance was considerably muted, even compared to the generally low-key treatment of the anniversary for the past several years. Unlike last year, there was apparently no rally in Moscow to mark the event, and Moscow did not report the speeches given at the usual receptions in Moscow and Pyongyang, restricting its coverage to brief comment and reports.

Pyongyang did not report the speeches at the Moscow reception, but did carry those by the Soviet ambassador and Vice Premier Choe Chae-u at the banquet in the North Korean capital. In his speech Choe emphasized DPRK attempts at negotiations, while the Soviet ambassador, according to KCNA, noted Soviet support for the North Korean demand for U.S. troop withdrawal. Using phraseology the North Koreans generally avoid, a NODONG SINMUN editorial article on the anniversary stated that Korean-Soviet friendship would develop "in the interests of socialism and the international communist movement." The phrasing may reflect recent discussions by a Korean Workers Party delegation to Moscow which, according to Moscow radio on 10 July, discussed "topical questions concerning the world communist movement."

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## U S S R

## REFORMIST LINE ON FOREIGN TRADE DEFENDED, CONTROVERSY HINTED

Strongly reformist proposals on Soviet foreign trade, made in a December 1973 NOVY MIR journal article by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Smelyakov,\* have been given a further boost and defended against sensationalist treatment by the foreign press in a recent article in the same journal. V. Yeliseyeva, a little known commentator on international affairs writing in the May (No. 5) issue of NOVY MIR on Smelyakov's proposals, argued that his suggestions had firm foundations in Lenin's writings and had in fact been preceded by similar criticisms from Brezhnev himself. While ostensibly aimed at certain foreign journalists, it seems virtually certain that the latest article also sought to defend Smelyakov's proposals against internal critics and opponents of reform.

The original Smelyakov article in the December 1973 (No. 12) issue of the journal was indeed vulnerable to charges of blackening Soviet reality and presenting the USSR in an unfavorable light. It complained that Soviet industry was not producing goods which could compete on the world market and that Soviet trade and industrial agencies were ineffective in promoting exports because of inflexibility, backward attitudes and traditional isolation. It argued that the Soviet Union should modernize its industry, raise the quality of its products and "learn from the West" in order to compete in the export market as a modern great power. Although implicitly criticizing bureaucratic restraints and political controls, Smelyakov had insisted that adapting the Soviet economy to the demands of the world market "will not cause damage to our planned economy, nor to the laws of socialist production, nor in particular to communist ideology." Nevertheless, his exposure of Soviet shortcomings appears to have been overly frank for some officials.

In the May article Yeliseyeva complained that certain articles in the NEW YORK TIMES and the Japanese DAILY YOMIURI made Smelyakov's article into a "supersensation" by claiming that it amounted to a virtually unprecedented admission by the Soviet press of the "advantages of the capitalist system over the

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\* For a detailed analysis of the Smelyakov article, see FBIS Special Report "Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," 5 April 1974, pages 10-13 and Appendix A.

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socialist system." Ridiculing the fuss made over Smelyakov's "arch-seditious" call to "learn from the West," she points out that Lenin long ago had called for this also. Countering the NEW YORK TIMES claim that Smelyakov "incautiously" had revealed "some hidden arguments in the Kremlin" by exposing shortcomings in Soviet industry and export trade, Yeliseyeva declared that criticism of such shortcomings was commonplace in the Soviet press and pointed out that Brezhnev himself, during a June 1973 talk with U.S. businessmen, had revealed that a recent Central Committee plenum had sharply criticized Soviet foreign trade agencies for shortcomings. Smelyakov was simply amplifying Brezhnev's remarks and attempting to help find a remedy for the shortcomings noted, said Yeliseyeva. Countering the Japanese paper's claim that the Smelyakov article represented a "call to abandon communist ideology," Yeliseyeva presented quotations from his article to prove the firm ideological basis of the article, referring among other things to his statement that a "class approach" was necessary in foreign trade competition with capitalists.

Furthermore, in what may have been a double edged admission, Yeliseyeva noted that Smelyakov's article was well received by Soviet readers and in fact stirred so much interest that Moscow journalists asked Smelyakov to hold a news conference in early 1974--a "lively and friendly" meeting, she said, at which the minister answered many questions about US-Soviet trade.

#### LEADERSHIP DISARRAY PERSISTS ON DECEMBER PLENUM ISSUES

A review of the public evidence on the implementation of the December 1973 CPSU plenum decisions reveals few concrete results thus far and considerable disarray among the leaders over what further measures should be taken. Only two measures directly traceable to the plenum have been enacted: the 12 January decree on socialist competition which is associated with Brezhnev, and the 22 April decree on light industry, which is clearly linked to Kosygin. As for the much touted major revision of the "whole system" of economic management said to have been proposed by Brezhnev at the plenum, few major changes are yet observable. The leaders have discussed various aspects of the economic reform issue in their election speeches, however, and the differing attitudes they have revealed may provide some clue as to the fate of these proposals, as well as the apparent stalemate over other issues.

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## DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF PLENUM

Various leaders have presented differing characterizations of the economic measures discussed at the plenum. Brezhnev, in the version of his remarks published in a recent collection of his speeches on agriculture, said that "partial measures" of reform had been proved insufficient and that the time had come to take up "the question of working out a whole system of serious measures to improve administration and planning and to improve the whole economic mechanism." What precisely he had in mind is not revealed in the published excerpts.

Shelepin has gone furthest in stressing the magnitude of the contemplated measures, characterizing them as comprehensive in two recent speeches. In a December speech in Turkmenia, as reported in the 26 December TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, Shelepin declared that Brezhnev's plenum speech had proposed a "whole system of planning, economic and organizational measures, aimed at improving all our economic mechanism and raising the effectiveness of its work and of its administration." In a June Leningrad election speech, reported in the 4 June LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, Shelepin stated that Brezhnev's plenum speech had posed "important measures relating to all spheres of the economy--economic, planning and organizational" and that the plenum had attacked the inertia and poor methods of management and planning which were hindering a "sharp turn" to quality in production.

In his report at the March Moscow city party election conference, reported in the 15 March MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Grishin also pictured the measures as wide-ranging, declaring that Brezhnev's plenum speech had outlined measures to "improve the organizational structure of economic administration, to improve planning, and to strengthen economic incentives." Ponomarev's 22 April Lenin anniversary speech declared that the December plenum had "outlined improvement of the organizational structure of the administration of the economy--which is now the key link in realizing the available opportunities."

On the other hand, Podgornyy appeared to play down the prospects of far-reaching changes, especially in organization. Referring to the plenum discussion in his 26 December Riga speech, he declared that "it is not a matter of some sort of radical re-organization of the existing system of administration--the branch principle has withstood the test of time," but he did note the need for more flexibility in economic leadership, improvement of the planning and organizational structure, and for fighting departmental and localist tendencies.

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Others have characterized the plenum discussions in narrower terms, and Brezhnev himself has recently implied that the plenum had concentrated on shortcomings in consumer goods production. In his 29 May Supreme Soviet election speech, Central Committee Industry Secretary Dolgikh declared that the plenum had "especially sharply raised questions connected with improving the quality of products, expanding their assortment, and improving consumer qualities of goods." In his 14 June Supreme Soviet election speech, Brezhnev, instead of citing the comprehensive nature of the plenum's discussion, stated that it had concentrated on bottlenecks and unused reserves, "in particular, in the food and light industries and other branches of group B, the growth rates of which still do not satisfy us." IZVESTIYA immediately took up Brezhnev's new characterization in a 18 June editorial, declaring that the plenum had "concentrated attention primarily on still unresolved questions," especially in the food and light industries and other branches of group B where growth is lagging.

KOSYGIN'S "DIRECT TIES"      Aside from the 12 January joint decree on socialist competition, which is directly traceable to the enthusiastic support for this measure voiced by Brezhnev in his plenum speech, the most notable action stemming from the plenum has been the 22 April Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree "On Some Measures to Improve Planning and Economic Incentives for Production of Goods of Light Industry." The specified purpose of the decree was to give production associations and enterprises of the Light Industry Ministry the right to set consumer goods production on the basis of orders from trade outlets, hence forcing producers to respond to changes in consumer demand and forcing them to improve product quality. The system of "direct ties" between enterprises and retail outlets had been introduced in 1965 as part of Kosygin's economic reform, but the intended extension of the system beyond the initial enterprises was not carried out.

The idea of increasing the consumers' power to influence assortment and quality of goods by widening of "direct ties" appeared prominently in several important articles closely following the December plenum, suggesting that the subject was one of the key matters discussed at the plenum. Both leading innovative economist N.P. Fedorenko, in a late November speech reported in the 7 January ECONOMIC GAZETTE, and his longtime conservative critic, Gosplan Deputy Chairman A.V. Bachurin, in a 11 February ECONOMIC GAZETTE article, complained that consumers need more rights in relation to producers and urged widening of "direct ties." In a 11 January PRAVDA article on improving the economic mechanism, PRAVDA first

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deputy chief editor V.G. Afanasyev argued that the power of the consumer in relation to the producer must be raised and that extension of "direct ties" would facilitate this. And in the 4 February ECONOMIC GAZETTE, N.F. Lobachev, deputy head of the Central Committee's section for planning and financial organs, complained that the 1965 decision to widely introduce "direct ties" was only being slowly implemented and proposed that enterprises' plans be considered fulfilled only when they have completed delivery of all goods contracted for.

Despite the enactment of the decree, the leadership's support for the measures has been lukewarm. Only IZVESTIYA published the decree--on 17 May, 25 days after its enactment. PRAVDA did not publish the decree, even though it found space to publish Central Committee-Council of Ministers decrees on such subjects as young pioneers, molecular biology, and on libraries during May, and despite the fact that it had prominently published the March 1973 decree on production associations. It was Kosygin who publicized the decree by holding a 24 April Council of Ministers meeting at which the decree was first announced. The decree had been signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin only two days earlier, and on the same day--22 April--Kosygin also issued a separate Council of Ministers decree following up on the joint decree with measures to improve the quality and assortment of light industry goods and improving the ties between trade and industry. Although similar meetings of the Ukrainian and RSFSR councils of ministers were held on 26 April and 29 April, there was no mention of the decree in the press reports on these sessions. In one of the rare articles describing the decree, a 13 May ECONOMIC GAZETTE article characterized it as "exceptionally important" and a "further development of the economic reform." It is indicative that during the June 1974 Supreme Soviet election speeches Kosygin was the only leader to even mention the decree.

Kosygin appears to have paid a price in terms of client tradeoffs for the leadership's endorsement of the decree. In January a one-time Brezhnev subordinate, Alma-Ata Gorkom First Secretary F.I. Mochalin, was appointed head of the Central Committee's section for light and food industry, replacing one-time Kosygin subordinate P.K. Sizov, who had been removed in July 1973.\* On the other hand, Kosygin may have gained in the appointment of Minsk Gorkom First Secretary N.N. Slyunkov as deputy chairman of Gosplan in mid-January. From 1965 to 1972 Slyunkov had been

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\* See the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, page 23.

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director of the Minsk Tractor Plant, which had won high praise for its computerization and use of modern management methods.\* The plant also used "direct ties" with its suppliers, according to a May 1972 KOMMUNIST article by Lobachev. During his November 1973 visit to Minsk Kosygin visited the plant, accompanied by Slyunkov, and in a 29 April 1974 speech Belorussian First Secretary Masherov praised the plant as an example of what good management and scientific progress can produce.

#### OTHER MEASURES

In addition to the decree on "direct ties" in light industry, there are indications that some other decisions have quietly been made also. A 28 May SOCIALIST INDUSTRY editorial revealed that "in conformity with decisions of the December plenum," a new system of evaluating the work of associations and enterprises will go into effect starting the second half of 1974. Henceforth, plans will be considered fulfilled only when contracts for delivery of goods are fulfilled. The editorial did not specify which branches this system would encompass, but the context in the editorial did suggest that it was not limited to light industry alone. In a 10 July SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article, V. Selyunin elaborated on this, indicating that the new system had started on 1 July and that bonuses would be cut for nonfulfillment of contracts.

In addition, in a 12 May PRAVDA article N.P. Fedorenko revealed that it had recently been decided to finally extend the new planning system introduced in the Moscow Main Administration for Vehicle Transport in 1965 to various other motor transport organizations. This experiment had also had Kosygin's enthusiastic support in 1965.

Further, Mazurov, Grishin and Andropov in their June Supreme Soviet election speeches indicated that new measures based on the December plenum decisions were still being worked on. Mazurov in particular, according to the 8 June SOVIET BELORUSSIA account of his speech, specified that measures were being worked on to improve planning, to provide more effect for economic levers and incentives "to raise the interest of enterprises and associations in adopting tight plans, and to insure the introduction of the achievements of science and technology into production." Gosplan Chairman N.K. Baybakov in the 23 May TRUD also stated that Gosplan was now considering introducing some new planning indicators, including ones reflecting introduction of scientific-technical achievements.

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\* See the TRENDS of 13 March 1974, page 14.

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THE PARTY ROLE Differences have been expressed also over the appropriate division of responsibilities between party overseers and technical specialists in the management of the economy. Brezhnev in his December plenum speech stressed that running the economy is a "political matter," called for upholding a "truly party style of work, a party approach in all spheres of economic activity," and declared that one cannot approach leadership of the economy "from narrow economic, much less technocratic, positions." Brezhnev's warnings against a "technocratic" approach were repeated by PRAVDA editorials on 11 and 15 February.

In contrast, a 31 May IZVESTIYA editorial addressed to the "huge army of economic leaders" stated that during the scientific-technical revolution the economy becomes too complex to rely on "traditional methods, practical habits and intuition" in making decisions. Intuition and experience are important, it admitted, but must be combined with a "strictly scientific approach." Further, IZVESTIYA cautioned executives to rely on specialists rather than issuing uninformed orders. It quoted Lenin as writing that "if a communist is an administrator, his first duty is to avoid getting carried away by giving orders, to be able to first consider what science has already worked out, to first ask whether facts have been checked, to first seek knowledge (in reports, in the press, at meetings, etc.), and only on this basis to change what is being done."

In their Supreme Soviet election speeches some leaders also reflected a clear desire for new methods. Masherov in particular, even while pursuing his customary hardline stress on ideology, emphasized the use of computers and mathematical methods, praised experimentation, and condemned cadres who do not want to abandon "archaic" methods of administration for modern, scientific methods. Kulakov, Mazurov and Demichev also appeared enthusiastic about modernizing administration and production.

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## NOTES

TITO-CEAUSESCU MEETING: The joint communique on Yugoslav President Tito's 8-11 July visit to Romania described the atmosphere of the talks as one of "friendship and sincerity, mutual respect and complete understanding." The repeated emphasis this year on sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and noninterference pointed up the concern of the two leaders to maintain a bold front against Soviet pressures. Only a single reference to this set of principles appeared in the 16 July 1973 communique. In a further gesture of independence, this year's final document said the LCY and RCP would work for unity of the world communist movement through cooperation with "all" communist parties. NCNA on the 12th carried an extensive, favorable report on the Tito-Ceausescu communique. Radio Moscow on the 16th reported a PRAVDA commentary which denounced Western press speculation about "the alleged intentions of the Soviet Union to exert pressure on Yugoslavia and Romania." PRAVDA had earlier reported the Tito-Ceausescu meeting without comment on the 12th.

MOSCOW ON CANADIAN ELECTIONS: Moscow has expressed approval of the results of the 8 July parliamentary elections in Canada. A commentary in PRAVDA on the 11th said that a key factor in the "convincing victory" of the Liberal Party had been "the foreign policy course pursued by the Trudeau government," including "the aspiration to develop mutually advantageous cooperation with various countries, including the Soviet Union and other socialist states." A PRAVDA article on the eve of the elections stressed that none of the contending parties had taken issue with the Trudeau government's foreign policy, while all political leaders had "reflected Canadian public attitudes by stressing the importance of further moves to relax international tension." Soviet commentary on the election pointed up support by Canadian figures for measures to further limit the "domination" of the economy by American capital and to reduce Canada's role in NATO, but it also stressed Canadian support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations and further progress on strategic arms limitation.

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NORTHERN IRELAND: Soviet media have been highly critical of Britain's new policy for Ulster, outlined on 4 July in an official "white paper." The criticisms are in line with Moscow's past appraisals of developments in Northern Ireland, emphasizing the themes that Protestant extremists seek unrestrained dominance over Ulster's affairs, that the rights of the Catholic minority remain unprotected, and that power-sharing arrangements between Protestants and Catholics will not work. Referring to the new British proposal that Ulster elect a 78-member constitutional convention to devise a new form of government, for example, commentator Igor Biryukov in PRAVDA on 10 July professed to see "profound contradictions" in the lack of guarantees against "arbitrary tyranny of armed Protestant gangs" and "usurpation of power" by Protestant Unionists. Speaking on Moscow radio's "Glance at the British Scene" on 5 July, political observer Anatoliy Gan was more direct, asserting that Britain's new policy "in effect delivers Northern Ireland to the mercy of the victors [in the mid-May general strike], the Protestant extremists." In recalling the mid-May events, which ended six months of power-sharing and led to restoration of direct rule by Britain, Gan accused London of having yielded "on every point" and of having "reaffirmed this surrender in its white paper." Soviet comment has also reiterated several proposals of long standing which Moscow and "progressive forces" in Ireland and Britain have advanced as prerequisites to a just settlement of Ulster's problems. As cited by TASS on 15 July, these preconditions include withdrawal of British troops to their barracks, an end to the internment of political prisoners, and the adoption of a formal bill of rights.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 JULY 1974

<u>Moscow (2788 items)</u>			<u>Peking (932 items)</u>		
Nixon USSR Visit	(28%)	10%	Law of the Sea	(18%)	21%
Podgorny in Somalia	(--)	10%	Conference		
[Podgorny Speeches	(--)	5%]	Criticism of Lin Piao	(8%)	9%
USSR-French Relations	(--)	7%	and Confucius		
[French Foreign	(--)	5%]	Indochina	(7%)	4%
Minister's Visit			[Sihanouk Rejection	(--)	3%]
China	(4%)	6%	of Lon Nol Coal-		
[Senator Jackson's	(--)	2%]	ition Government		
Visit			Proposal		
Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 Mission	(5%)	4%	Japan	(2%)	4%
Chile	(3%)	4%	PRC-DPRK Treaty 3d An-	(--)	3%
Mongolian Revolution Anni-	(--)	4%	niversary		
versary			Albanian Army Day	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.